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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 This case raises important issues at the intersection 
of two principles:  our deep-seated belief that a district court 
must be permitted to protect the integrity of its fact-finding 
process, and the settled considerations which courts in the  
United States must heed when considering whether to enjoin the 
executive activities of a foreign sovereign carried out in that 
  
sovereign's own territory.  The district court found that the 
Republic of the Philippines was harassing witnesses who had 
testified against it in a suit it had brought in federal court in 
New Jersey.  Thus, the court enjoined the Republic from 
continuing this harassment.  The court also denied interlocutory 
certification of an underlying jury verdict so as to enforce its 
injunction, and ordered that any settlement in the case be 
conditioned upon acceptance of the court's continuing 
jurisdiction to enforce its injunctions.  Because the district 




 In 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (the 
"Republic") and the National Power Corporation ("NPC") filed a 
complaint against Westinghouse Electrical Corporation and 
Westinghouse International Projects Company (collectively 
"Westinghouse") and Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc. ("Burns and 
Roe") concerning the construction of a nuclear power plant in 
Bagac, Bataan.  The fifteen-count complaint alleged breach of 
contract, fraud, tortious interference with fiduciary duties, 
negligence, civil conspiracy, violations of state and federal 
racketeering statutes, and violations of the Robinson-Patman Act 
and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  The district court 
determined that all but two of the counts against Westinghouse 
were subject to international arbitration.  Republic of the 
Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 714 F. Supp. 1362 
(D. N.J. 1989).  Thus, most of the Republic's claims against 
Westinghouse were referred to arbitration under the Rules of 
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce.1  In the remaining two counts, the Republic and NPC 
alleged that Westinghouse and Burns and Roe had conspired to 
bribe then-President Ferdinand Marcos in order to win the power 
plant contract, and had thus tortiously interfered with the 
fiduciary duties that Marcos had owed the people of the 
Philippines. 
                     
1
. The court ruled that only one count of the plaintiffs' 
complaint against Burns and Roe was subject to arbitration, but 
  
 While preparation for the trial on the tortious 
interference counts proceeded in New Jersey, arbitration 
implicating the other counts proceeded apace in Geneva.  In late 
1991, reaching the bribery allegations in the context of the 
Republic's challenge to the validity of the contract's 
arbitration clause, the arbitrators found that the Republic had 
failed to show that Westinghouse had bribed President Marcos.  
When the arbitrators included this finding in a preliminary award 
for Westinghouse and Burns and Roe, entered in December, 1991, 
the defendants moved for summary judgment in the district court, 
claiming the arbitrators' preliminary award collaterally estopped 
the Republic and NPC from litigating the bribery and tortious 
interference claims.  The district court denied the motion and, 
when settlement discussions broke down, the case went to trial in 
March, 1993. 
 As the district court noted in the opinion supporting 
the order now before us, "[f]rom all accounts in the Philippine 
press, [the filing of the suit against Westinghouse and Burns and 
Roe and the arbitration in Geneva] assumed enormous importance in 
the eyes of Philippines leaders."  District Court Opinion ("Op." 
at 5.  The court explained that "[c]onstruction of the power 
plant had been undertaken to help solve the desperate electrical 
power shortage in the Philippines.  Huge foreign loans were 
incurred to pay for the project."  Id.  When Marcos left the 
(..continued) 
nevertheless stayed all of the non-bribery counts against Burns 
and Roe in the interest of judicial economy. 
  
Philippines and the Aquino government suspended construction of 
the power plant, "the Republic found itself with a partially 
completed plant which was producing no electricity, an ever 
worsening shortage of electrical power, and a huge foreign debt 
burden on which, it is said, interest alone amounts to $300,000 
each day."  Id.  Thus, the court surmised that "[i]t appears that 
the leaders of the Republic looked to a judgment in this case and 
in the arbitration proceedings as the solution to these 
staggering problems."  Id.  The court further surmised that this 
factual context "may provide some explanation of the untoward 
events which transpired after the jury rendered a verdict against 
the Republic."  Id. 
 During the trial, two Filipino Westinghouse workers, 
Pedro A. Padre, Jr. and Jerry R. Orlina, testified for 
Westinghouse.  In addition, Westinghouse introduced an affidavit 
from Perfecto V. Fernandez, a professor of law at the government-
owned University of the Philippines.  The affidavit had been 
rendered two years prior to the trial, when Westinghouse had 
moved for summary judgment, and discussed Philippine law relevant 
to the issues in the case.  This testimony, the subsequent 
actions threatened and taken by the Republic against the 




 After a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict for 
Westinghouse and Burns and Roe on the bribery and tortious 
interference counts.  Because the other claims were still stayed 
pending arbitration, the Republic filed a motion for 
certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) to appeal the 
issues that had been adjudicated.  At a hearing held on June 28, 
1993 to consider this motion, the court was inclined to grant 
certification, stating that "there is no case more appropriate 
for certification than this one" (Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 41) 
and that "clearly [the case] should be certified" (J.A. at 44). 
 However, Westinghouse then advised the court that it 
had evidence that Padre, Orlina and Fernandez were being harassed 
and subjected to retaliation by Philippine officials because of 
their testimony on behalf of Westinghouse.  When these 
allegations were brought to its attention, the court abruptly 
changed its mind about certification, stating that although the 
facts needed to be developed, 
 if there is a basis to [the allegation of 
harassment], it is a very, very serious 
charge, because nobody could come into this 
Court and then abuse people who come and 
testify.  Some very dramatic, drastic 
remedies would have to be provided . . . It 
would be destructive of our whole system.  No 
foreign government should be allowed to use 
our court system and then not play fair with 
the witnesses in the case.  I can't think of 
anything more destructive of our system, and 
simply could not permit it. 
  
J.A. at 49-50.  The court concluded that it must "hold off" on 
signing the Rule 54(b) certification because it would lose 
jurisdiction once the notice of appeal was filed.  Id. at 50. 
 The court ordered briefing and requested a motion from 
Westinghouse formally requesting relief from the court.  
Westinghouse filed a motion requesting that the court (1) enjoin 
the Republic from further harassing any witnesses, (2) sanction 
the Republic by barring it from further prosecuting its claims 
before the district court or appealing the adverse jury verdict, 
and (3) grant Westinghouse its attorneys' fees incurred on the 
motion.  
 The court held a hearing in early July, 1993, at which 
argument was presented on the documentary evidence submitted by 
the parties relating to the Westinghouse motion, including 
affidavits of various parties, transcripts of television 
programs, news clippings, and other data.  In correspondence with 
the parties after the hearing, the court explained that, having 
considered materials submitted by the Republic with a renewed 
motion for certification, it believed that "the Republic ha[d] 
anticipated some of the requirements which are contained in my 
proposed order [addressing the allegations of harassment], 
although others remain to be fulfilled."  J.A. at 107.  Thus, the 
court circulated its proposed opinion and order and scheduled 
another hearing for September 27, 1993, at which it heard 
argument about the actions the Republic had taken to address the 
court's concerns.  Not fully satisfied with the Republic's 
  
explanations at this final hearing, however, the district court 
indicated that it would finalize its opinion and order shortly. 
 On October 4, 1993, the court filed the opinion and 
order.  The court found that, since the jury verdict, Orlina, 
Padre, and Professor Fernandez had been "the target of 
vilification in the public press inspired by officials in the 
Philippines government and each has been the target of actual or 
threatened government action."  Op. at 15.  The court stated that 
the "attack[s]" were "spearheaded" by Francisco A. Villa, Overall 
Deputy Ombudsman of the Republic, a presidential appointee whose 
duties include initiating investigations and directing "any 
public official to perform any act required by law and to request 
assistance from any governmental agency."  Id. at 16. 
 The court found that Deputy Ombudsman Villa had 
threatened on numerous occasions to take legal action for tax 
fraud against Padre and Orlina as a result of their testimony on 
behalf of Westinghouse.  The court found that both Padre and 
Orlina had faced public censure and lost business opportunities 
because of the Republic's actions, and that they would be 
financially ruined if tax evasion charges were brought against 
them.  In this regard, the court also found it significant that 
another Filipino who had been involved in the same activities as 
Padre and Orlina had agreed to testify for the Republic -- and 
was then granted immunity from prosecution for tax evasion.  Op. 
at 13, 19. 
 The court also documented that Villa had initiated 
disciplinary proceedings against Professor Fernandez for having 
  
allegedly violated Philippine law by testifying against the 
government while under its employ.  Although the Republic had 
known about Fernandez' affidavit when it was submitted to the 
court in 1991, Villa filed charges relating to the affidavit on 
May 31, 1993, twelve days after the verdict.  Villa charged that, 
by filing an affidavit on behalf of Westinghouse, Fernandez had 
violated his duty as a public officer "to be loyal at all times 
to the Republic and the Filipino people . . . ."  Op. at 21, 
quoting administrative complaint.  The court noted that the 
administrative complaint concluded by stating that Fernandez, "in 
a cowardly attempt to escape the clutches of the law, whimpered 
`I'm not even a government official.  I'm just a lowly college 
professor.'"  Op. at 21, quoting administrative complaint, which 
quotes Philippines Daily Inquirer (May 20, 1993).  The complaint 
also quoted approvingly from a news columnist who had written 
that "Professor Fernandez should not only be fired from the State 
University but should be hanged in public at the courtyard of the 
Nuclear Plant in Morong, Bataan . . . ."  Id.  The court 
additionally found that Villa had called Fernandez a traitor "on 
a number of occasions, including a television show," and that 
"this characterization was repeated in the Philippine press."  
Id.  Based on the tone and substance of the administrative 
complaint, as well as the circumstances surrounding its filing, 
the court concluded that the charges against Fernandez were 
"motivated by rage at the jury verdict rather than considered 
judgment . . . ."  Id. 
  
 The Republic had submitted an affidavit from Villa 
purporting to establish that he did not institute proceedings 
against Fernandez because of the jury verdict, that Padre's and 
Orlina's fears are unwarranted, and that the Ombudsman's Office 
has not harassed any witness and had no intention of doing so.  
Op. at 24.  However, the court found that Villa lacked 
credibility.  Given the evidence of record, "for [Villa] to state 
that `[Padre's and Orlina's] fears and apprehensions are 
unfounded' is poppycock."  Id. at 25.  Furthermore, according to 
the court, the statements about Fernandez in Villa's affidavit 
continued to "reflect the Republic's rage at losing the case and 
its intent to strike out at one of the three persons seized upon 
as scapegoats for that loss."  Id.  And the court found that 
Villa's assertion that the Ombudsman's Office was not guilty of 
harassment was "simply not true."  Id. at 25. 
 Although the evidence of harassment centered on Villa, 
the court determined that other members of the Philippines 
government had supported Villa's efforts.  The court found ample 
evidence that Villa "was acting in accordance with the policies 
of the Office of the Executive, President Ramos."  Op. at 22.  
The court also found that the harassment was not confined to the 
executive branch of government.  Id. at 17 (noting that a 
Philippine senator had urged a study of the "culpability" of the 
three witnesses). 
 The court acknowledged that the Republic had submitted 
evidence purporting to show that the government did not support 
any action designed to harass or intimidate witnesses, and that 
  
the government specifically did not intend to pursue any charges 
against Padre, Orlina, or Fernandez.2  The court noted that the 
evidence demonstrated "a partial retreat from the retaliatory 
conduct" the court had documented and indicated that the Republic 
intends "not to pursue the retaliatory conduct further against 
Padre and Orlina."  Op. at 28.  However, the court noted that the 
proceedings against Fernandez "continue[d] unabated."  Id. at 30. 
 Because the court found that the Republic's actions 
"threaten[] both the integrity of a United States District Court 
and the foundations of our system of justice" (Op. at 32), it 
concluded that it must take action.  Accordingly, it (1) enjoined 
the Republic from harassing any witness who had given evidence or 
will give evidence in this case or the arbitration proceeding; 
(2) directed the Republic to renounce and abandon its retaliatory 
actions, and to advise Padre and Orlina officially of its actions 
and intended actions with respect to their personal income taxes; 
(3) denied certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ("Rule 54(b) 
certification") until the Republic established that it was in 
compliance with the injunctive provisions of the court's order 
and that the proceedings against Fernandez were resolved "in a 
                     
2
. With the renewed motion for certification, the Republic 
submitted a press release and statement noting that the Republic 
did not condone any retaliation against any past or future 
witness in any legal proceeding; documents purporting to show 
that Villa's proceedings against Fernandez were not in 
retaliation for his affidavit, but because Fernandez violated the 
law, and that Villa acted independently of the Executive; and 
statements purporting to establish that the government had taken 
steps to correct any mistaken impression that it intends to 
retaliate against any witness. 
  
manner which cures the retaliatory actions"; and (4) directed 
that any settlement in the case must provide that the parties 
agree to the court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce the 
provisions of the order.  Op. at 35-36; Order at 1-3.3  The 
Republic appeals this order in its entirety. 
 II. 
 The Republic's challenge to the district court's order 
presents three issues:  (1) whether the district court exceeded 
its authority in issuing the injunctive portions of its order; 
(2) whether the district court erred in refusing Rule 54(b) 
certification; and (3) whether the district court exceeded its 
authority in ordering that if the parties settle, they must 
stipulate to the district court's continuing jurisdiction to 
enforce its order.  We have jurisdiction over the injunctive 
portions of this order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),4 and because 
of our resolution of the Republic's challenge to the injunctions, 
we find that the Rule 54(b) issue becomes moot. 
                     
3
.   The court denied without prejudice Westinghouse's motion to 
bar the Republic from proceeding with this case, as well as 
Westinghouse's request for attorneys' fees. 
4
. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides that, with exceptions not 
relevant here, "the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from:  (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of 
the United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing 




   The Republic has not adequately presented the 
issue of whether the district court's factual findings constitute 
clear error.5  Nevertheless, it is clear from the briefing that 
the Republic disputes the district court's factual conclusions, 
and we reach the Republic's challenge because of the significance 
of this case not only to a foreign sovereign, but also to our 
domestic legal system.  We believe the evidence supports the 
district court's conclusion that Deputy Ombudsman Villa, with the 
support of other members of the Philippines government, pursued a 
campaign designed to smear Padre, Orlina, and Fernandez as 
scapegoats for the Republic's failure to achieve victory in the 
district court. 
                     
5
. Although the Republic stated in its initial briefing that 
it "strongly disagrees" with the district court's findings "that 
Philippine government officials engaged in retaliation against or 
harassment of witnesses in this case" (Appellant's Br. at 19), it 
did not squarely challenge those findings as clearly erroneous.  
See Burns and Roe Br. at 14 (noting Republic's failure to 
challenge findings).  The Republic did raise the issue of clear 
error in its reply brief (Appellant's Reply Br. at 10-16), but 
that was one brief too late:  we have often instructed that 
"appellants are required to set forth the issues raised on appeal 
and to present an argument in support of those issues in their 
opening brief."  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 
1993); Institute for Scientific Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, 
Science Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1011 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Daggett v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793, 795 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987); see 
also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(3) (requiring appellant to provide in 
brief "[a] statement of the issues presented for review"); Third 
Cir. Loc. App. R. 28.1(a)(i) (noting that party must comply with 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(3) by designating where in record the issue 
presented for appeal was raised and what standard of review 
applies).  
  
 We further agree with the district court's observation 
that such behavior had "a doubly subversive effect.  First, 
witnesses, who should have been able to rely upon both the 
implicit and explicit assurances of th[e district] court that 
they could testify fully and freely without fear of any 
retaliatory actions, have been betrayed."  Op. at 33.  
Additionally, "witnesses from the Philippines will fear to 
testify for Westinghouse and against the Republic in the 
arbitration proceedings and in any future proceedings in th[e 
district] court, preventing each tribunal from receiving all the 
facts."  Id.  We therefore find no error in the district court's 
conclusion that the Republic's harassment created a "situation 
that no court can tolerate, and that effective relief must be 
granted."  Id. at 34. 
 Before we turn to the question of whether the district 
court's chosen relief was an abuse of its discretion, however, we 
note certain facts of significance.  Although the district court 
found that the Republic's acts were retaliatory, it did not find 
that they were without foundation.  In other words, the district 
court did not find that Padre and Orlina could not, under normal 
circumstances, be prosecuted for the activities they admitted to 
in open court in New Jersey.  The court also stated that it 
accepted for purposes of its order that "under normal 
circumstances" Villa could file charges against Fernandez for his 
  
acceptance of compensation for providing an affidavit in this 
case.  Op. at 34.6   
 The court also concluded that by the time it filed its 
order, the Republic had taken steps to "cure the effects of the 
retaliatory actions against Padre and Orlina and any additional 
steps which may be required can be taken readily."  Id.  The only 
element of the challenged conduct that remained was the 
administrative complaint against Fernandez. 
 Additionally, the court concluded for the purposes of 
its order that the Ombudsman's Office is independent of the 
Executive Branch.  Op. at 34.  Thus, it tacitly accepted the 
argument that the Republic could not compel Villa to withdraw his 
complaint against Fernandez (see id.), and for the purposes of 
this opinion, we make the same assumption.7 
 We also note a subsequent factual development not 
considered by the district court.  During the pendency of this 
matter before us, we were informed by counsel for the Republic 
                     
6
. We reach no conclusion about whether the evidence provided 
at trial, or the fact of Fernandez' providing affidavits to 
Westinghouse, constitute evidence of wrongdoing under Philippines 
law.  We note only that the district court did not conclude that 
the charges against Padre, Orlina, and Fernandez were meritless, 
whatever the motivations may have been in threatening or bringing 
them. 
7
. Indeed, there appears to be substantial support for this 
proposition.  See Constitution of the Philippines Art. XI, § 5 
(1987) (Office of the Ombudsman established as independent 
office); In re Raul M. Gonzalez, 160 S.C.R.A. 771, 775 (1988) 
(Ombudsman and deputies may be removed only through impeachment 
in Congress for "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, 
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of 
the public trust"). 
  
that the administrative proceeding that had been initiated by 
Villa against Fernandez had been dismissed by the President of 
the University of the Philippines.  Noting that Fernandez had 
offered his opinion on a matter of public importance, the 
President of the University wrote that while  
 [i]t is conceded that Prof. Fernandez' point 
of view may appear to be unacceptable to some 
or more Filipinos[,] . . . the role of 
academe is to continually engender varying 
thoughts, positions, theories and postulates 
on various key issues and concerns affecting 
the nation.  This is not the first time that 
a dissenting voice has been put forth against 
the position taken by officials of the 
Republic and if the University is to remain 
at all one of the bastions of free thought 
and speech, it most certainly will not be the 
last. 
Order, In re Complaint of Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa v. 
Prof. Perfecto V. Fernandez of the College of Law 6 (May 5, 
1994).8 
 With these facts in mind, we now address whether the 
injunctive portions of the court's order were lawful exercises of 
the court's discretion. 
                     
8
. Cessation of the Republic's threats of tax fraud 
investigations against Padre and Orlina, and dismissal of the 
administrative complaint against Fernandez, do not moot the 
Republic's appeal of the injunctive portions of the order, since 
the district court's order is still in effect and that order 
reaches conduct targeted at other individuals, as well as the 
three named.  Yet these facts may play a role in the district 
court's assessment of a proper sanction of the Republic. 
  
 B. 
 The district court's findings force us to confront 
fundamental issues involving a federal court's power to control 
litigants who come before it.  As discussed below, a district 
court's power to sanction or exercise other forms of judicial 
control over a foreign sovereign is not coterminous with its 
power to regulate or punish other litigants.  Here, in issuing an 
order which purports to supervise and control the law enforcement 
activities of a foreign sovereign nation against its own citizens 
on its own soil, the district court exceeded the boundaries of 
its lawful discretion. 
  
 1. 
 Our legal system will endure only so long as members of 
society continue to believe that our courts endeavor to provide 
untainted, unbiased forums in which justice may be found and 
done.  Thus, it is beyond peradventure that district courts have 
broad authority to preserve and protect their essential function.  
To ensure that district courts have tools available to protect 
their truth-seeking process, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allow district courts to sanction parties who fail to meet 
minimum standards of conduct in many different contexts.  E.g., 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (groundless pleadings and other papers); 16(f) 
(failing to abide by pretrial orders); 26(g), 30(g), 37(d), and 
37(g) (discovery abuses), 41(b) (involuntary dismissal for 
failure to prosecute, failure to follow rules, or failure to obey 
court order); 45(f) (disobeying subpoena); 56(g) (providing 
affidavit at summary judgment in bad faith or for delay).  
Congress has also enacted laws providing additional powers to 
district courts to police misconduct.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 
(contempt power); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (punishing attorneys who 
vexatiously multiply proceedings).  See generally Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2142 (1991) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (listing sources of sanctioning authority). 
 Nor do those formal rules and legislative dictates 
exhaust district courts' power to control misbehaving litigants.  
To the contrary, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that a 
district court has inherent authority to impose sanctions upon 
those who would abuse the judicial process.  Chambers, 111 S. Ct. 
  
at 2132.  In Chambers, a private party challenged a district 
court's order making him liable to his opponent for attorneys' 
fees of nearly $1 million expended because of the party's bad 
faith conduct during the course of litigation.  The Court 
rejected the challenge, finding that the order was an appropriate 
exercise of the court's inherent powers to control litigants.  
The Court explained that "[i]t has long been understood that 
`certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of 
justice from the nature of their institution,' powers `which 
cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary 
to the exercise of all others.'"  Id., quoting United States v. 
Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).9  Such salutary powers, the 
Court noted, "are `governed not by rule or statute but by the 
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs 
so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 
                     
9
. The Court, in fact, unanimously recognized that district 
courts have inherent authority to fashion sanctions against 
parties in certain circumstances.  Justice Scalia disagreed with 
the majority's interpretation of the order at issue in the case 
and therefore dissented, but nevertheless agreed with the 
majority that a court has the ability to "enter orders protecting 
the integrity of its proceedings."  Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 
U.S. 32, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2140 (1991).  And while Justice 
Kennedy, in a dissent joined by the Chief Justice and Justice 
Souter, believed that a district court must first exhaust express 
grants of sanctioning power before utilizing its inherent 
authority (id. at 2141), he did not gainsay that district courts 
have such authority and may use it to combat abuses of the 
judicial process when other, express sources of authority fail 
(id. at 2141, 2149). 
  
cases.'"  Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2132, quoting Link v. Wabash R. 
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).10  
 Of course, "[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent 
powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion."  
Chambers, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 45.  "A primary aspect of [a district 
court's] discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate 
sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process" (id. 
(emphasis added)).  Thus, a district court must ensure that there 
is an adequate factual predicate for flexing its substantial 
muscle under its inherent powers, and must also ensure that the 
sanction is tailored to address the harm identified.  In 
exercising its discretion under its inherent powers, the court 
should be guided by the same considerations that guide it in the 
imposition of sanctions under the Federal Rules.  First, the 
court must consider the conduct at issue and explain why the 
                     
10
. Illustrating the variety of powers exercised by a district 
court, the Supreme Court noted that courts can discipline 
attorneys, punish contempt, vacate judgments obtained by fraud, 
investigate whether a fraud upon the court has been committed, 
bar from the courtroom those who disrupt proceedings, dismiss 
actions on the ground of forum non conveniens, and dismiss a suit 
for failure to prosecute.  Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2132-33.  In 
the same spirit, we have noted that a district court may dismiss 
a suit outright in response to litigation abuses.  Eash v. 
Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 566 (3d Cir. 1985) (in 
banc); see also, e.g., Frumkin v. Mayo Clinic, 965 F.2d 620, 627 
(8th Cir. 1992) (court likely would not have abused discretion if 
it had dismissed suit because plaintiff had intimidated 
witnesses); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 
Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam) (dismissal under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 37 not an abuse of discretion).  And certainly, in 
appropriate circumstances, a district may enjoin a wrongdoing 
party from continuing its wrongful conduct or direct it to take 
corrective action.  Cf. Gregory v. Depte, 896 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 
1990) (contempt sanction). 
  
conduct warrants sanction.11  If an attorney, rather than a 
client, is at fault, the sanction should ordinarily target the 
culpable attorney.  Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Center, 804 
F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir. 1986); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and 
Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1987).  Cf. Poulis v. 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 
1984) (court must consider "the extent of the party's personal 
responsibility," but this factor "is not dispositive, because a 
client cannot always avoid the consequences of the acts or 
omissions of its counsel").  Obviously, a pattern of wrongdoing 
may require a stiffer sanction than an isolated incident; a grave 
wrongdoing may compel a more severe sanction than might a minor 
infraction; and wrongdoing that actually prejudices the 
                     
11
. Although we stated in Landon v. Hunt, 938 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 
1991), that "a prerequisite for the exercise of the district 
court's inherent power to sanction is a finding of bad faith 
conduct" (id. at 454), that statement should not be read to 
require a finding of bad faith in every case, regardless of the 
sanction contemplated.  Landon addressed the propriety of 
assessing attorneys' fees against a litigant; thus, we followed 
the Supreme Court's decision in Chambers, which also involved 
assessment of attorneys' fees.  Landon, 938 F.2d at 454.  Under 
the American Rule, attorneys' fees ordinarily may not be shifted 
to a losing party.  However, the Court in Chambers had relied on 
an exception to that rule allowing fees to be shifted when the 
losing party exhibited "bad faith."  Chambers, 111 S. Ct. 2133.  
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, however, the fact 
that fee-shifting as a sanction requires a finding of bad faith 
"in no way means that all sanctions imposed under the courts' 
inherent authority require a finding of bad faith."  Id. at 2140.  
Thus, a court need not always find bad faith before sanctioning 
under its inherent powers:  "[s]ince necessity does not depend 
upon a litigant's state of mind, the inherent sanctioning power 
must extend to situations involving less than bad faith."  Id.; 
see generally Estate of Leon Spear v. Commissioner of IRS, No. 
93-7727, __ F.3d __, 1994 WL 656893 at *9-*10 (3d Cir. Nov. 21, 
1994) (discussing role of bad faith in sanctioning). 
  
wrongdoer's opponent or hinders the administration of justice may 
demand a stronger response than wrongdoing that, through good 
fortune or diligence of court or counsel, fails to achieve its 
untoward object.  Furthermore, there may be mitigating factors 
that must be accounted for in shaping the court's response. 
 Second, having evaluated the conduct at issue, the 
district court must specifically consider the range of 
permissible sanctions and explain why less severe alternatives to 
the sanction imposed are inadequate or inappropriate.  Although 
the court need not "exhaust all other sanctioning mechanisms 
prior to resorting to its inherent power" (Landon v. Hunt, 938 
F.2d at 450, 454 (3d Cir. 1991)), the court must explain why it 
has chosen any particular sanction from the range of alternatives 
it has identified.  See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (sanctions under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 and 37). 
  
 2. 
 The district court did not explain under what authority 
it was proceeding in enjoining the Republic.  We deduce from the 
circumstances, and assume for purposes of evaluating the 
injunctive provisions of the district court's order, that it was 
acting under its inherent authority.  "We review a district 
court's imposition of sanctions under its inherent power for 
abuse of discretion" (Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2138), but we have 
made it clear that "a district court `would necessarily abuse its 
discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law 
or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.'"  Garr v. 
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1279 (3d Cir. 1994), quoting 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). 
 At their core, the injunctive portions of the district 
court's order implicate international comity, that elusive 
doctrine -- something more than mere international manners, but 
less than obligation -- which attempts to mediate the frictions 
inherent in a community of sovereign states.  Comity, in the 
words of Justice Gray, 
 is the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, 
executive, or judicial acts of another 
nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to 
the rights of its own citizens or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its 
laws. 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).  The doctrine "is a 
nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due 
regard both to international duty and convenience and to the 
  
rights of persons protected by its own laws."  Somportex Ltd. v. 
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971).  
Consequently, "comity serves our international system like the 
mortar which cements together a brick house.  No one would 
willingly permit the mortar to crumble or be chipped away for 
fear of compromising the entire structure."  Laker Airways Ltd. 
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
 Comity cannot be the source of a disability that 
prevents a district court from having the power to address 
wrongdoing that impacts a domestic court.  As Hilton makes clear, 
comity must yield to domestic policy:  "no nation will suffer the 
laws of another to interfere with her own to the injury of her 
citizens . . . ."  Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164.  Thus, "from the 
earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligation 
of comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum 
are vitiated by the foreign act."  Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 
937. 
 But while it is true that principles of comity cannot 
compel a domestic court to uphold foreign interests at the 
expense of the public policies of the forum state, it can -- and 
does -- force courts in the United States to tailor their 
remedies carefully to avoid undue interference with the domestic 
activities of other sovereign nations.  Comity is essentially a 
version of the golden rule:  a "concept of doing to others as you 
would have them do to you . . . ."  Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. 
Supp. 128, 132 (S.D. N.Y. 1994); see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
  
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).  Thus, 
it may be permissible to prescribe and enforce rules of law in a 
foreign country, but unreasonable to do so in a particular manner 
because of the intrusiveness of a particular type of sanction.  
That is the case here:  the district court had the power to 
sanction the Republic for its wrongdoing, but it should not have 
entered the injunctive provisions at issue here. 
 The mere fact of sovereignty does not insulate a 
litigant from sanction for failure to abide by the rules 
governing litigation in American courts.  It would be perverse to 
allow a foreign sovereign litigant to "take our law free from the 
claims of justice."  National City Bank of New York v. Republic 
of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955).  The Republic's actions, 
although taken in a foreign country, undeniably had effects in 
the United States.  Under general principles of international 
law, a tribunal may prescribe laws with respect to "conduct 
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial 
effect within its territory."  Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States §402(c) (1987) (the 
"Restatement").  And where a court may prescribe, it may also 
enforce.  Id. § 431(1) ("A state may employ judicial or 
nonjudicial measures to induce or compel compliance or punish 
non-compliance with its laws or regulations, provided it has 
jurisdiction to prescribe in accordance with §§ 402 and 403"); 
see also United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1036 (2d Cir. 
1985).  Thus, because the district court found that the 
Republic's actions compromised the court's ability to adjudicate 
  
fairly the claims before it, the district court had the power to 
address the retaliatory conduct notwithstanding that it 
transpired on foreign soil half a world away. 
 However, any exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe and 
enforce sanctions based on the effects of foreign activity in a 
domestic court requires the court to balance the interests it 
seeks to protect against the interests of any other sovereign 
that might exercise authority over the same conduct.  See Romero 
v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959) 
(interpreting Jones Act in light of "due recognition of our self-
regarding respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations 
in the regulation of maritime commerce"); Mannington Mills, Inc. 
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting 
with respect to United States antitrust laws that "[w]hen foreign 
nations are involved . . . it is unwise to ignore the fact that 
foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial 
power are considerations that should have a bearing on the 
decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction"); Timberlane Lumber 
Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(endorsing "jurisdictional rule of reason" in potential 
extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws); 
Restatement § 402, 403.  Consequently, although the courts of 
appeals have occasionally approved orders issued by district 
courts enjoining proceedings in foreign countries that would 
interfere with the proper exercise of district court 
jurisdiction, they have recognized that such action must be 
  
exercised only in rare cases, and must be premised on a thorough 
analysis of the interests at stake.12 
 This balancing is evident in the principal cases 
advanced by both the Republic and Westinghouse in support or 
                     
12
. The Restatement provides a useful, non-exclusive list of 
factors that should be considered when a court contemplates 
extending its reach to punish extraterritorial conduct: 
 
 (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the 
regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the 
activity takes place within the territory, or has 
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in 
the territory; 
 
 (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or 
economic activity, between the regulating state and the 
person principally responsible for the activity to be 
regulated, or between that state and those whom the 
regulation is designed to protect; 
 
 (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the 
importance of the regulation to the regulating state, 
the extent to which other states regulate such 
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of 
such regulation is generally accepted; 
 
 (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be 
protected or hurt by the regulation; 
 
 (e) the importance of the regulation to the international 
political, legal, or economic system; 
 
 (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with 
the traditions of the international system; 
 
 (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest 
in regulating the activity; and  
 
 (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another 
state. 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 403(2) (1987).  As the Restatement makes clear, this 
list is "not exhaustive."  Id., comment b. 
  
their respective positions.  For example, in United States v. 
Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985), Davis, a United States 
citizen, was charged with money laundering. Prior to trial, the 
United States government issued a subpoena to the Cayman Islands 
branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia, directing it to produce 
documents relating to Davis' activities.  When it appeared that 
the bank would comply with the subpoena, Davis filed an action 
seeking a temporary restraining order in the Cayman Islands to 
prevent the bank from disclosing the records, claiming that the 
district court action was improper and that the bank's compliance 
with the subpoena would violate a Cayman Islands law.  In 
response, the district court ordered Davis to cease his legal 
proceedings in the Cayman Islands. 
 The Second Circuit held that the district court had 
properly exercised its discretion in enjoining Davis from 
pursuing the Cayman Islands litigation.  Davis, 767 F.2d at 1037.  
The Court provided three reasons:  (1) the Cayman Islands 
litigation "had a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect on 
the United States," in that it was "instituted and pursued with 
the express purpose of" frustrating the United States action; 
(2) Davis had close links to this country and was thus subject to 
the court's jurisdiction; and (3) "the United States had a strong 
national interest in safeguarding the integrity of its criminal 
process."  Id. 
 The Davis court warned, however, that because orders 
enjoining parties from pursuing litigation in foreign tribunals 
"often restrict[] the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal," such 
  
orders "should . . . be used sparingly."  Davis, 767 F.2d at 
1038.  Accordingly, the court emphasized that "because an order 
enjoining a litigant from continuing a foreign action is facially 
obstructive, international comity demands that this extraordinary 
remedy be used only after other means of redressing the injury 
sought to be avoided have been explored."  Id. 
 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), is quite similar.  Laker Airlines 
("Laker") filed a private antitrust suit in the United States 
against four American defendants, two British defendants, a 
Belgian defendant, and a Swiss defendant.  In response, the 
foreign defendants filed suit in Britain and secured an 
injunction prohibiting Laker from pursuing its case against them 
in the United States court.  Laker, in turn, requested and 
secured a restraining order in the United States prohibiting the 
American defendants from instituting similar preemptive suits in 
the United Kingdom.  Laker then filed another antitrust suit in 
the same United States district court naming two additional 
defendants, one Dutch and the other Belgian, and sought and 
received a restraining order prohibiting these defendants from 
seeking relief from suit in Britain. 
 The Dutch and Belgian defendants in the second American 
action appealed the injunction, claiming that the district court 
had exceeded its jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce -- and 
violated principles of international comity -- in enjoining the 
defendants from seeking relief in the British courts.  The 
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, finding the injunction was 
  
proper because litigation in Britain was designed solely to 
terminate the United States litigation and deprive the United 
States court of its rightful jurisdiction.  Laker Airways, 731 
F.2d at 930.  However, the Laker Airways court stressed that 
comity required that the power to issue anti-suit injunctions be 
used "only in the most compelling circumstances," because such 
injunctions "effectively restrict the foreign court's ability to 
exercise its jurisdiction."  Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927. 
 In Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of 
North America, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981), we faced an 
injunction similar to those addressed in Davis and Laker Airways, 
but we reversed the district court.  In Compagnie des Bauxites, 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea ("CBG") brought a claim against 
several insurance companies because they would not honor a claim 
on policies issued to CBG.  Almost four years later, the 
insurance companies filed a suit in the High Court of Justice, 
Queen's Bench Division in London, seeking a declaratory judgment 
rescinding the contract on the ground that CBG had failed to 
disclose material facts.  The district court enjoined prosecution 
of the action in England, finding that the second action was 
duplicative, harassing and vexatious. 
 On appeal, we declined to "determine that the district 
court lacks the power to enjoin parties from pursuing an action 
in another jurisdiction in every case."  Compagnie des Bauxites, 
651 F.2d at 887.  We found, however, that the sole reasons for 
the district court's injunction -- "duplication of issues and the 
insurers' delay in filing the [foreign] action" -- were 
  
insufficient to justify "the breach of comity among the courts of 
separate sovereignties."  Id. 
 Thus, what we recognized in Compagnie des Bauxites, 
like the courts in Davis and Laker Airways, is that the exercise 
of a power to prescribe and enforce requires a balancing in each 
case.  The domestic court's purpose in protecting a particular 
interest must be set against the interests of any other sovereign 
that might exercise authority over the same conduct.13 
 Westinghouse urges that Compagnie des Bauxites, Laker 
Airways, and Davis demonstrate that the district court's 
injunction in this case was a permissible exercise of its power 
to protect "the proper exercise of its jurisdiction."  
Westinghouse Br. at 36, 37-38.  The Republic correctly counters 
that the injunction in this case was very different from those 
issued in the cases relied upon by Westinghouse.  We assume, 
without deciding, that the district court had the power to 
provide the injunctive relief it purported to provide here.  Our 
focus, however, is on comity.  Unlike the district courts in 
Compagnie des Bauxites, Laker Airways, and Davis, the court here 
did not simply enjoin private litigants from pursuing parallel 
litigation in foreign jurisdictions.  Here, the district court's 
injunctions purport to place the court in the position of 
supervising the law enforcement activities of a foreign sovereign 
                     
13
. Similar balancing is also evident in the other principal 
case relied upon by Westinghouse.  See Mutual Service Casualty 
Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 919, 923 (M.D. Ala. 
1992) (recognizing need to balance interests at stake in 
respective jurisdictions). 
  
nation against its own citizens on its own soil.  The injunctive 
paragraphs of the district court's order provide the following: 
 (1) the Republic is "permanently enjoined 
from taking any action against any 
witness who has testified or will 
testify" in this action or the 
arbitration "where that action is in 
retaliation for such testimony or has 
the intent or effect of harassing such a 
witness for his or her testimony or 
intimidating such a witness to change or 
withhold his or her testimony"; and  
 
 (2) The Republic is "directed to take 
appropriate steps to renounce and 
abandon the retaliatory actions which 
the court has found to have taken place, 
which steps shall include officially 
advising Pedro A. Padre, Jr. and Jerry 
R. Orlina of the Republic's actions and 
intended actions with respect to their 
personal income taxes . . . ." 
 
 (3) "Should the parties settle this case, the 
agreement of settlement and any judgment 
implementing it shall contain a provision that 
each party accepts the continuing jurisdiction of 
th[e district] court to enforce the provisions of 
this order." 
Op. at 35; Order at 1-3. 
 The first two injunctive provisions thrust the district 
court into the internal affairs of the Republic.14  The district 
court acknowledged that the first injunctive paragraph, which 
prohibits retaliation against not only Padre and Orlina, but "any 
witness who has testified or will testify" in this action or the 
arbitration, could place it in the position of acting, as the 
                     
14
. The third injunctive paragraph, concerning settlement, is 
addressed infra pp. 38-39 
. 
  
Republic's counsel put it to the district court, as "a special 
master over at least 50 witnesses who have already participated 
for both sides and are participating today in the arbitration, as 
well as literally hundreds of potential witnesses . . . ."  J.A. 
92.  If any of those Filipinos received a traffic citation, or 
was involved in a tax fraud investigation, or had any other 
scrape with the law, the court acknowledged that it could be 
called upon by the individual to make a finding as to whether the 
Republic's prosecution was intended to harass or intimidate the 
witness.  J.A. 93.  And although the court did not go so far as 
to find that tax charges against Padre and Orlina would be 
unfounded (see supra p. 14), the second injunctive paragraph 
effectively directs the Republic to grant Padre and Orlina 
immunity from prosecution for past tax law violations.15 
 We are unaware of any court in the United States -- or 
elsewhere -- that has ever attempted to inject itself in this 
manner into the internal law enforcement activities of a foreign 
                     
15
. Recalling that comity is like the golden rule, one could 
imagine the profound legal -- indeed, constitutional -- issues 
that would arise if the Executive Branch of the United States 
government were enjoined by a foreign court the way the district 
court has enjoined the Republic here.  Were the shoe on the other 
foot, we would surely find it intolerable for a court in the 
Philippines to order the President of the United States to 
provide immunity for witnesses who had testified in a Philippines 
proceeding, silence members of Congress who called for an 
investigation of those witnesses, prevent members of Congress 
from even speaking in a manner that could be interpreted as 
harassment of those witnesses, or fire an independent prosecutor 
who had threatened or initiated proceedings against such 
witnesses. 
  
sovereign.16  The unique nature of the district court's 
injunctions is demonstrated by comparison to background precepts 
of international relations.  Although countries sometimes 
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce laws that reach 
extraterritorial conduct, it is nevertheless widely accepted that 
each sovereign nation has the sole jurisdiction to prescribe and 
administer its own laws, in its own country, pertaining to its 
own citizens, in its own discretion.  This principle was 
articulated in by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange 
v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812): 
 The jurisdiction of the nation within its own 
territory is necessarily exclusive and 
absolute.  It is susceptible of no limitation 
not imposed by itself.  Any restriction upon 
it, deriving validity from an external 
source, would imply a diminution of its 
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, 
and an investment of that sovereignty to the 
same extent in that power which could impose 
such restriction. 
Id. at 136.  In his classic text on conflict of laws, Joseph 
Story agreed with his former colleague.  Synthesizing the views 
of many publicists, Justice Story concluded that "it is an 
essential attribute of every sovereignty, that it has no admitted 
superior, and that it gives the supreme law within its own 
dominions on all subjects appertaining to its sovereignty."  
                     
16
. Despite the facial similarity of this case to those decided 
under the act of state doctrine, this case is not cognizable 
under that rubric.  The act of state doctrine is confined to 
cases in which a litigant seeks to challenge the validity of a 
public act of a foreign sovereign.  W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. 
v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1992). 
  
Story on Conflict of Laws § 8 (7th ed. 1872).  And more recently, 
Professor Charles Hyde echoed Justice Story in explaining that 
"[i]ndependent States are equal in the sense that they resemble 
each other in possessing and enjoying the same privilege of 
freedom from external control in the management of their domestic 
or foreign affairs."  Charles C. Hyde, 1 International Law § 11 
at 27 (2d rev. ed. 1951).  He added that "[a] State which 
habitually contents itself with less ceases to be the equal of 
independent States and finds itself in an inferior class."  Id. 
at 28.17 
 The principle also finds recognition in the 
Restatement:  "[u]nder international law, a state has . . . 
                     
17
. In addition to Story and Hyde, other scholars and 
publicists have long recognized the principle that a state is not 
subject to outside legal control of its internal legal affairs.  
E.g., Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace 102 (Kelsey ed. 
1925) ("That power is called sovereign whose actions are not 
subject to the legal control of another"); 4 Blackstone's 
Commentaries 66 (Sharswood ed. 1879) ("no[] . . . state[] will 
allow a superiority in the other"); Lassa F.L. Oppenheim, 1 
International Law § 125 at 288 (8th ed. 1955) ("in the absence of 
treaty provisions to the contrary, a State is not allowed to 
interfere in the management of [other States'] internal or 
international affairs, nor to prevent them from doing or to 
compel them to do certain acts in their domestic relations or 
international intercourse"); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society:  
A Study of Order in World Politics 70 (1977) ("At the heart of 
th[e] complex of rules [of international coexistence] is the 
principle that each state accepts the duty to respect the 
sovereignty or supreme jurisdiction of every other state over its 
own citizens and domain, in return for the right to expect 
similar respect for its own sovereignty from other states"); 
Urban G. Whitaker, Jr., Politics and Power 411 (1964) ("Of all 
[the] elements bearing on problems of jurisdiction, the most 
important is territory.  Once it is decided which state controls 
what territory, it is possible to determine whose laws apply, 
whose courts may sit in judgment and who may enforce the law"). 
  
sovereignty over its territory and general authority over its 
nationals[.]"  § 206(a).  The Restatement explains that the term 
"sovereignty" is used in section 206(a) to imply "a state's 
lawful control over its territory generally to the exclusion of 
other states, authority to govern in that territory, and 
authority to apply law there."  Id. comment (a).18 
                     
18
. This fundamental principle is also reflected in our law of 
sovereign immunity.  Courts of the United States no longer apply 
the "absolute" theory of sovereign immunity which once prevailed, 
supported by broad dicta in The Schooner Exchange, under which 
foreign states were deemed completely immune to suit in the 
United States.  The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812).  However, the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity still has profound effects upon the 
jurisdiction of domestic courts.  The more modern, "restrictive" 
theory of foreign sovereign immunity, which was "largely 
codifi[ed]" by the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 
(Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., __ U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 
2160, 2165 (1992), provides that "a state is immune from the 
jurisdiction of foreign courts as to its sovereign or public acts 
(jure imperii), but not as to those that are private or 
commercial in character (jure gestionis)."  Saudi Arabia v. 
Nelson, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1479 (1993) (citations 
omitted).  Thus, the Act embodies the fundamental principle that 
sovereigns are generally immune from interference by courts in 
the United States.  As the Supreme Court recently explained in 
Saudi Arabia, 113 S. Ct. 1471, "[u]nder the Act, a foreign state 
is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States 
courts; unless a specified exception applies, a federal court 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign 
state."  Id. at 1476 (citations omitted). 
 
 Certainly when, as in this case, a sovereign brings suit in 
the United States, it subjects itself to jurisdiction over 
matters incident to the suit, including counterclaims by the 
defendant (subject to limitations in the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act).  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1607; Nat'l City Bank 
of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361-63 (1955).  
But even in such circumstances, it cannot be seriously suggested 
that the plaintiff sovereign gives up its essential attributes of 
sovereignty, including in particular its authority to administer 
in its sole discretion its own laws respecting its own citizens 
within its own territory. 
  
 It is fundamental that law enforcement is a core 
function of government, and a court should be loathe to interfere 
with a foreign sovereign's exercise of such power if alternatives 
are available that may achieve the same result with less 
derogation of sovereignty.  As we have made clear, supra n.10 and 
accompanying text, the district court had substantial power at 
its disposal in this case.  It could have imposed monetary 
sanctions to signal its disapproval of the Republic's conduct and 
its intolerance of any future harassment or intimidation.  It 
could also have dismissed the case.  See supra n.10 (discussing 
Chambers, Eash, and National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey 
Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam)).19  To have 
exercised its discretion consistent with its authority, however, 
the district court should have balanced the interests at stake.  
This the court did not do,20 and thus it failed to recognize that 
                     
19
. Although we have stated that "[d]ismissal must be a 
sanction of last, not first, resort" (Poulis v. State Farm Fire 
and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 869 (3d Cir. 1984)), we did not 
mean to imply that it was, in all circumstances, the most extreme 
penalty possible.  This case illustrates the exception:  here, 
although dismissal would prevent the Republic from going forward 
with its claims, it would be less intrusive into the internal 
affairs of the Republic -- and therefore significantly less 
harmful to principles of international comity -- than the 
injunctive alternative chosen by the district court.  Thus, 
Westinghouse misconceives the impact of the injunction in this 
case in arguing that because the district court had the "greater" 
power to dismiss this case, it could also enter the injunction as 
an exercise of a "lesser" power.  Westinghouse Br. at 42. 
20
. The court recognized that its power to influence the 
proceedings against Fernandez was cabined by the "limits which 
United States courts impose upon themselves when asked to enjoin 
proceedings in other nations."  Op. at 34, citing Compagnie des 
Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 877 (3d 
Cir. 1981).  The court found that it could avoid any limitations 
  
the extraordinarily intrusive nature of its injunctive provisions 
made such relief inappropriate. 
 Additionally, in this case as in any other, the 
district court should have noted what alternative sanctions were 
available, and at the very least should have explained why those 
options would not have achieved the results desired. See Davis, 
767 F.2d at 1038.  Yet the record is devoid of evidence that the 
district court considered any sanctions less drastic than the 
injunctive provisions it adopted. 
 The district court's error was compounded by its 
response when the Republic came forward, before the court's order 
was formalized, with evidence that it had achieved substantial 
compliance with paragraphs (1) and (2) of the draft order, at 
least with respect to Padre and Orlina.  At that point, it was 
particularly inadvisable for the district court to have followed 
(..continued) 
on its authority by addressing Fernandez' situation "without 
enjoining the proceedings against him.  I will simply defer 
granting the Republic's Rule 54(b) motion until I am satisfied 
that in one way or another the proceedings against Professor 
Fernandez have been resolved in a manner which cures the 
retaliatory actions described above."  Op. at 34-35.   
 
 The court stated, however, that it did not "even want to 
hear anything about" the viability of its injunctive provisions, 
because it "[knew] that [it] ha[d] the authority to do it.  
Anybody who is a litigant here is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Court."  J.A. 103-04.  The court further believed that any 
sovereign immunity the Republic had was waived when it filed suit 
in New Jersey, making the Republic exactly like any other 
litigant.  Thus, the court stated that it did not "even want any 
research on that," because if the Republic did not have to submit 
to the court's authority, "I might as well pack up and go home."  
J.A. at 104. 
  
through by entering those portions of its order because there was 
evidence that they were no longer even necessary. 
 Consequently, those portions of the court's order must 
be vacated.  Although the district court could sanction the 
Republic for taking lawful actions for retaliatory reasons, the 
court could not interpose itself into the Republic's law 
enforcement functions as it attempted to do in its order.  As 
explained below, we will remand for a redetermination of 
sanctions. 
 Because we are vacating the principal injunctive 
portions of the district court's order, it is also necessary to 
vacate its third injunctive provision, in which the court 
required that any settlement include a provision acknowledging 
the district court's continued jurisdiction to enforce its order.  
That provision no longer has any purpose once the other 
injunctions are vacated.21 
                     
21
. Additionally, we note that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1)(ii), parties to a civil action may stipulate to a 
dismissal of an action at any time.  A court has no authority to 
disapprove or place conditions on any such dismissal.  First 
Nat'l Bank v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 
1969).  As the Eighth Circuit recognized in Gardiner v. A.H. 
Robins Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984), such an attempt 
would "deprive[] the parties of their unconditional right to a 
Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) dismissal by stipulation."  Id. at 1190. 
  
 C. 
 The district court's order also provided that the 
Republic's motion for certification under Rule 54(b) would "not 
be granted until it establishes that it is in full compliance 
with" the principal injunctive portions of the order, discussed 
above, and "until the Court finds that the proceedings against 
Professor Perfecto V. Fernandez have been resolved in a manner 
which cures the retaliatory actions described above."  Order at 
2.  The Republic asks us to find that the district court erred in 
refusing to certify the Republic's appeal under Rule 54(b).  We 
find, however, that the Republic's challenge to this portion of 
the order is moot.  We have invalidated the provisions of the 
order with which the Republic had to comply, and, as explained 
above, supra p. 15-16, the proceedings against Professor 
Fernandez were resolved in a manner that completely vindicated 
him.  Thus, we need not reach the thorny issue of whether -- and 
how -- we could assert jurisdiction over a district court's 
denial of a motion to certify under Rule 54(b). 
 Of course, we are not directing the district court to 
certify any portion of this case for interlocutory review at this 
time.  The decision to certify must be reached, if at all, after 
a sound exercise of the district court's discretion upon motion 
by one or both of the parties after remand. 
  
 IV. 
 The Republic should be sanctioned for having retaliated 
against Padre, Orlina, and Fernandez.  The district court moved 
with commendable expedition and firmness to address the trespass 
on its authority and integrity embodied in the retaliation by the 
Republic against Padre, Orlina and Fernandez.  An American court 
cannot tolerate litigants' intimidation of witnesses, regardless 
of whether a litigant happens to be a foreign sovereign.  
However, for the reasons given, we conclude that the central 
elements of the district court's order went too far, and, 
accordingly, that order will be vacated.  On remand, the district 
court shall reassess what sanctions should be imposed upon the 
Republic consistent with international comity as described in 
section III(B), supra.  The district court should take into 
consideration the status of the Republic's actions regarding 
Padre, Orlina, and Fernandez, but we do not prejudge what 
sanctions should be imposed.  In all events, however, when 
evaluating the issue of sanctions the district court shall set 
forth its findings in accordance with our discussion of 
sanctioning procedure in section III(B)(1), supra. 
 We will not instruct the district court to certify the 
jury verdict at this time.  That question will be left to the 
district court's sound discretion upon proper motion by the 
Republic. 
